KARA MOSKOWITZ

Local Histories of International Development in Decolonizing Kenya: Using Oral Histories to Understand Global Connections

Wilberforce Oyalo, a Kenyan secondary school graduate who joined the department of Settlement in 1963, traveled to Israel for training in the late 1960s. Joseph Juma Lukorito, a lab technician working at a Kenyan paper factory, traveled to Sweden and Germany in the 1980s and 1990s. While most rural Kenyans did not travel beyond the nation's borders in the second half of the twentieth century, the world often came to them. Settlement schemes—which resettled Africans on land that colonial white settlers had appropriated—not only employed Oyalo, but also brought in volunteers and aid workers from Germany, the United States, the Netherlands, Norway, Japan, and more. Further, an Indian company owned the factory where Lukorito worked, and he interacted with the Indian management daily. In other words, development engendered the global circulation of people and ideas. Both those Kenyans who traveled abroad and those who stayed closer to home participated in these processes.

International development history is a subfield of world history. This scholarship has highlighted international affairs, transnational organizations, mobile people, and global connections, centering on elite decision-makers, such as politicians and bureaucrats, whose ideas and policies transcended national borders. The international development historiography has relied primarily on discursive analysis of the written records of institutions, organizations, states, and individual technocrats. Development had national and transnational dimensions, certainly, but it was carried out locally. This article contends that granular, grounded sources, particularly oral histories, are integral to transnational historical research generally, and to international development history particularly. These sources give voice to those excluded from the archives, illustrate the multiple unique ways in which local and international spaces became entwined, and highlight the irreconcilable understandings and experiences of development's impact.

This article focuses on oral histories with rural Kenyan technocrats responsible for implementing development, Kenyan farmers who were the targets of development,

and American Peace Corps Volunteers placed in rural Kenya. Archival sources complement the oral histories. Written records were drawn from the Kenya National Archives, the Kennedy Library, Kenyan parliamentary debates, the United States National Archives and Records Administration, and the World Bank Archives. Relying on these sources, I reveal the many networks connecting global spaces, and I highlight dissonant perceptions of development. Though historical scholarship has often highlighted Western hegemony through the imposition of development ideologies, neither Kenyans nor other development targets were passive recipients. Further, the accounts presented here vary dramatically. The archival and oral record of Western institutions tend to depict their development programs as impactful, but the rural Kenyans interviewed neither emphasized the content of their trainings abroad nor recounted an important Western presence in their lives at home.

Indeed, oral histories make clear that local practices and understandings of development diverged from the development plans and reports deposited in archives. Oral sources show that trainings – for Kenyan technocrats and for American volunteers – were neither particularly effective nor preparatory for the actual jobs they took on or the circumstances they encountered. They bring to life the experiences of Kenyans who traveled abroad, and of Americans who traveled to Kenya, offering unique insights into the local dynamics of development work. Oral histories with rural Kenyans reveal infrequent engagements with foreign development actors, as most were unaware that development volunteers and practitioners worked in their communities. Archival sources, on the other hand, frequently reflect the development theories behind the trainings rather than evaluating their practical use, and tend to embellish the impact of these programs. These sources are shaped not only by ideologies, but also, by the pressure to demonstrate efficacy in order to garner future funding. In relying largely on the written record, historians have unwittingly privileged this perspective.

The following article is divided into four sections. The article begins with an exploration of the oral methods used for this research. From there, a background section provides context on international development and decolonization in mid-twentieth century Kenya. The third section draws primarily on the life histories of two Kenyans who traveled abroad for trainings. In the final part, I focus on oral histories with rural Kenyans who encountered Western aid workers, alongside oral histories of Peace Corps Volunteers.

Oral History Methods

Africanist scholars have long been at the forefront of oral historical methods and innovations, and the historiography has relied extensively on oral histories since its inception. In 1965, Jan Vansina argued that oral evidence could be reliable.[1] Subsequently, Africanist historians moved beyond oral tradition in the precolonial era to

utilize oral histories in the more recent African past, recognizing the bias of written records, particularly colonial archives. Luise White has deeply influenced the field of oral history, upending accepted methods, by arguing with her informants in order to "understand what is important enough … to defend."[2] White repudiated the emphasis on evaluating the accuracy of oral sources, instead, underscoring "divisions and tensions," and rumors and gossip.[3] Following White's interventions, historians have continually developed original oral methods. Leroy Vail and Landeg White have drawn on oral performance in southern Africa to understand power and authority.[4] David Cohen and Stephen Feierman have used oral history to critique the reliance on European categories and to draw attention to silences in the scholarship.[5] More recently, Derek Peterson has questioned the division between "oral and literate culture," Kenda Mutongi has written a historical ethnography, immersing herself in the local stories of a small community, and Jacob Dlamini has sought "neither to confirm nor to challenge" oral accounts, but to examine the "context, circumstances, and contingencies."[6]

Many of these works engage with global settings, largely through colonial interactions. However, much of the literature which falls more firmly into the category of "Africa and the World" does not rely as extensively on oral history. Indeed, some of the most influential histories of international development in Africa have not included oral histories as sources.[7] The global history and international development history scholarship, as a whole, have been slow to integrate oral histories.[8] Yet, as Africanists have been arguing for over a half-century now, oral histories are important historical sources, especially where vast power imbalances exist, and especially, because the archive is a site of a particular knowledge production and of erasure. While a substantial global scholarship has emphasized the epistemology of the archive, these findings have too rarely emboldened scholars to use oral sources in response.[9]

This article draws on over a hundred oral histories collected at eight different sites in rural western Kenya, though it centers especially on the life histories of a handful of Kenyan men. Some of these men traveled abroad for trainings and some recounted engaging with Western aid workers in their villages. These life histories are complemented with oral historical research among a wider group of rural Kenyans, who did not travel abroad or emphasize encounters with Western development practitioners, and with the recorded oral histories of returned Peace Corps Volunteers (PCVs) who were placed in rural Kenya during the 1960s and 1970s. This combination of oral histories highlights the numerous global networks connecting rural Kenya to the world, and demonstrates the multi-directional movement of people and ideas. These oral sources also reveal dissonant perceptions and accounts of development. Not only do PCV descriptions differ dramatically from rural Kenyan ones, but Kenyans who traveled abroad offered distinctive narratives of their experiences from that of the archival record. This dissonance should not be particularly surprising, and yet, by not seeking

out oral sources, historians of international development have, at times, privileged the viewpoints of Western aid workers and policymakers whose correspondence, reports, and plans are deposited in transnational institutional repositories and national archives.

The interviews for this article took place on the border of Uasin Gishu District and Kakamega District in the western Rift Valley.[10] This highland region occupies a contradictory place in Kenya's development history. On the one hand, it has been semi-peripheral to the economy and to the centers of power. Though the land is fertile, farmers cannot grow the reliably profitable crops of coffee and tea, and it sits distant from the capital of Nairobi. At the same time, during the colonial period, this region drew white settlers and, during decolonization in the early 1960s, it became a site of land resettlement and agricultural development. Development interventions brought foreign "experts," and helped transform some residents into local technocrats.



Image 1: Image of Lumakanda village, 2013, one site where the author conducted interviews. Photograph by the author.

The Uasin Gishu-Kakamega border remains profoundly rural. The vast majority of interviewees were modest farmers, though some had previously worked off-farm in towns. Some were landowners, while others were squatters.[11] They ranged in age from

about 60 to 100 years old, and came from the three predominant ethnic groups in the region: the Kalenjin (Nandi subgroup), the Luyia (primarily the Maragoli subgroup), and the Gikuyu.[12] More than half of the interviewees were women, but the life histories presented here focus on men, simply because they possessed greater opportunities to travel abroad for trainings and were significantly more likely to interact with Western aid workers. Given this bias, I use gender as an analytic. Though certain programs targeted women, development represented a deeply male domain, with interventions aimed at men and development jobs generally reserved for men.[13] I interviewed only a few former agricultural development officials, but they are disproportionately represented given the focus on international education and training.

Development has been, and continues to be, a divisive issue in Kenya, particularly in this region, which has experienced much political violence related to land disputes.[14] This context shaped the oral research methodologies I employed, which focused on collaboration and trust. For almost every interview, I worked with a local research assistant. Given that the western highlands are multi-ethnic, I worked with three different research assistants with different linguistic skills and local networks. Each research assistant introduced me to local people, provided translations, and served as my first sounding board for ideas about how to interpret our discussions. While collecting oral histories, I lived with a family who resided in one of the villages where I conducted interviews. I also made multiple visits to many of the people I interviewed, returning over the course of seven years, from 2012 to 2018. I visited some people three, four, or five times, gradually developing friendships, familiarity, and trust.

When I began, I used a semi-structured interview guide designed to open up conversations about historical moments of local importance, while encouraging the people I spoke with to contextualize these events with their personal narratives. I drew on archival research—both that which was present and that which was absent from the written record—to craft questions. I began interviews with life histories to understand the background of the people I spoke with.[15] From life histories, I moved on to questions about land settlement, agricultural production, and development programs in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. In particular, I tried to reconstruct how interviewees came to settle where they did, what types of crops they grew, what successes and failures they had as farmers, what assistance they received—from the government, from other institutions, and from their communities. I then asked questions about their social lives and local development—how the lives of men and women differed, how they sought access to education and health services, and how they participated in the development of their villages. Lastly, I asked more general questions about their understandings of development, citizenship, and nation-building in the decades after independence. My questions evolved over time, as I gained a better sense of the ways in which the people I spoke with understood their own histories. I often returned to follow up on new lines of inquiry or to seek further information about moments of critical importance. Generally,

these oral histories revealed that few rural Kenyans knew foreign aid practitioners worked in their region, but they also seldom encountered the overburdened more junior Kenyan officials tasked with providing them with agricultural services.

When I interviewed former agricultural or development officials, my questions differed. I still began with life histories and utilized my archival findings to formulate questions. However, I focused especially on their jobs and their experiences working in land resettlement and agricultural development. At times, I used these interviews to try to better comprehend particular aspects of these byzantine programs. I also sought to understand officials' quotidian lives, while exploring how they saw their role in the development apparatus and their relationship to the farmers with whom they worked. Lastly, I asked former development officials about how they conceptualized the outcomes of the various programs they participated in implementing. Unlike archival sources, which tend to focus on technical issues and bureaucratic procedure, oral histories expose the impact of trainings, the ideologies of officials, and their everyday experiences implementing development in local communities.

I did not conduct the oral histories with Peace Corps Volunteers, which come from the Returned Peace Corps Volunteer Collection deposited in the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library (JFKL). The Kennedy library started soliciting materials from returned volunteers in 1989. The RPCV Oral History Archives Project (OHAP)—a collaborative effort between the Kennedy Library and the National Peace Corps Association—conducted most of the oral interviews. Though nearly 800 interviews have now been collected, I focus on five digitized oral histories with PCVs, who lived in Kenya during the 1960s and 1970s and who worked in settlement or agricultural development. Robert Klein, a returned PCV who served in Ghana from 1961 to 1963, conducted three of these interviews, while Evelyn Ganzglass, another returned PCV who was placed in Somalia from 1966 to 1968, conducted two. Certainly, it can be challenging to rely on oral histories conducted by others. The interviewer may focus on issues of little relevance to one's research, while at the same time other questions of interest may go unanswered. Even so, these are lengthy interviews, which offer a great deal of insight into the early Peace Corps in Kenya and are invaluable sources, particularly when combined with rural Kenyan oral accounts and the archival record.

As with archival documents, oral histories must be interpreted critically. I have sought in my writing to balance different accounts, and where these accounts conflict, to examine why. In some instances, Kenyans narrated oral histories that contradicted one another, or contradicted archival evidence. In other instances, Kenyans seemed to use the language of prevailing economic development ideologies. Neither source is privileged. With the former, Kenyans were often exposing the contours of postcolonial debates, articulating their dissatisfaction with development policy. With the latter, Kenyan technocrats were reproducing developmental discourses, which they had come to genuinely believe, and which they relied on to confirm and uphold their own claims to

expertise. Thus, while these oral histories are contentious and dissonant, following other scholars, I focus less on the accuracy of this information and more on what these disagreements, omissions, and recompositions reveal.

The Context

Kenya gained independence in a world increasingly shaped by development. During decolonization, the everyday struggles and successes of many rural Kenyans revolved around gaining access to development resources, particularly land and agricultural aid. For national politicians and policymakers, too, independence represented an opportunity to pursue progress. It was not just Kenyan citizens and state actors who conceptualized independence through development, but also transnational organizations and foreign nations, which played a hands-on role in designing and implementing postcolonial development projects.

As a settler colony, the Kenyan colonial state had appropriated African land for European ownership throughout the first half of the twentieth century. During independence negotiations, land was, therefore, a pivotal issue. Ultimately, the delegates agreed that European land would be purchased for African settlement at market value. The Million Acre Scheme (MAS), the largest resettlement program in Kenyan history, planned the transfer of 1.17 million acres of land from European to African ownership, and followed land reforms implemented in other postcolonial settings, such as Latin America, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. Between 1962 and 1967, close to half a million Kenyans settled on new farms through this program.[16] The Million Acre Scheme was just the biggest of the decolonizing programs aimed at restructuring land tenure, redistributing land, and fostering agricultural development. The MAS was part of a broader set of postwar development programs increasingly influenced by international institutions and foreign nations.[17]

Land reform emphasized plot consolidation, individual ownership, and economies of scale, while also encouraging the production of commodities—much for export—with the use of fertilizer, grade cattle, and synthetic seeds. Much more than an agricultural program, the MAS "served as a land transfer program, a national development project, and a buyout plan for European settlers," and thus included financing, marketing, and social engineering components.[18] Given the complexity of resettling tens of thousands of Kenyan families, while simultaneously instituting agricultural reforms and building new communities, the MAS involved a dizzying number of domestic actors and international partners, as well as foreign nations. Not only did the World Bank, the United Kingdom, West Germany, and the Colonial Development Corporation participate in the creation and enactment of this program, but development workers from all over the Western world—with and without relevant experience—traveled to assist on these schemes.

In Kenya, the MAS warranted its own ministry of Lands and Settlement and engendered the formation of an army of local bureaucrats, tasked with demarcating boundaries, teaching agricultural techniques, distributing inputs, organizing cooperatives, building infrastructure, and collecting land loans, among many other tasks. Indeed, low-level rural officials undertook much of the day-to-day work of these programs, largely unsupervised. Across the resettlement sites of the new nation, local bureaucrats and rural Kenyans reworked the high modernist planning of transnational funders, bilateral donors, and the Kenyan government. At times, central planning errors—such as misguided budgeting assumptions, failure to include plots for schools or health centers, deficient watering points, or grade cattle shortages—required local modifications.[19] Farmers and rural officials also contravened state regulations about settler selection processes and ignored standardized farming recommendations. In addition, rural Kenyans contested the bureaucratic advice of local officials, negotiating which crops they could grow, and sometimes refusing to use costly artificial insemination or cattle dip services.[20] While planning took place in Nairobi, London, and Washington, D.C., execution occurred on the ground, with officials creatively adapting to their local settings, while farmers made decisions to improve their circumstances regardless of state policies.

The Kenyan state continually bemoaned its undisciplined, unqualified labor pool, and many departments remained woefully understaffed for years at a time. Settlement thus catalyzed the circulation of development workers, both to and from Kenya. Some Kenyan technocrats traveled abroad for training, while some foreign nations sent aid workers to Kenya to assist.

Global Trainings

As a former part of the white highlands—an area which had been reserved exclusively for European settlement—the western Rift Valley became a site of land resettlement during decolonization, thus drawing Kenyan settlers and would-be Kenyan development technocrats to the region. Wilberforce Oyalo fell into the latter category. A secondary school graduate in the 1950s, Oyalo entered the workforce at a moment primed for job creation in the agricultural development and land reform sectors. As in many global settings, metropolitan powers found themselves increasingly on the backfoot in the 1950s, struggling to justify colonial rule in the postwar world. Often, they responded to growing dissent with development. Indeed, colonial administrators introduced Kenya's first large-scale land reform in 1954—the Swynnerton Plan—in response to the Mau Mau rebellion.[21] Growers' licenses for cash crops—previously, reserved for Europeans only—became available to some Africans in this period, and an order-in-council abolished the scheduled areas, or white highlands, as a legal entity in 1960, ending racial restrictions.[22] All of these changes meant increasing attention to, and investment in,

land reform and agricultural development, and a growing need for rural technocrats like Oyalo.

After completing school, Oyalo applied for various positions and was offered a job in the ministry of Agriculture to perform extension work. Extension entailed providing agricultural aid and education to rural farmers with the intention of bettering agriculturalists and maximizing their production. As Kenya gained independence in December 1963, Oyalo was assigned to the Chekalini settlement scheme. Chekalini—which covered an area of 10,699 acres and had close to 400 settlers—was designed for sisal, maize, and dairy on small, 15-acre farms.[23] Oyalo, who grew up on a family farm in Bunyore, possessed a similar background to many of the African settlers on this majority Luyia scheme. He recounted that, at the time, most settlement officers were Europeans.[24] Africans often worked on the technical side under white settlement officers or agricultural officers. Oyalo, and other extension workers, walked or biked from farm to farm, teaching Kenyan farmers agricultural techniques, instructing them on how to proportion the different crops, and on when to plant. Oyalo described the job simply, "Mine was to teach what they should do on their land."[25] He bounced around to different settlements in the area, moving between Chekalini, Mautuma, and Lugari during the 1960s and 1970s.

When he returned to Chekalini in the early 1970s, Oyalo was selected to go to Israel for training. Israel served as a site for Kenyan development and agricultural trainings, and conversely, sent its own nationals to Kenya to work on development programs.[26] For Kenya, the Israeli government perhaps most influenced cooperative policy. Following the visit of a group of Kenyan agricultural officials to Israel in 1962, Arie Amir, Israel's deputy minister of Agriculture, remained in Kenya for two years to advise on Kenyan cooperative farming.[27] Given their more limited resources at the time compared to other bilateral donors and aid provisioners, Israel provided targeted aid, especially in the rural development sector, which gave its narrow interventions the appearance of outsized effect. In its openness to collaborating with consulting firms and institutions such as the World Bank, the Israeli state further expanded its impact. Israel concentrated not only on cooperatives, but "technical assistance in feasibility studies, project preparation, and also training of local staff."[28] While Israel could rarely offer grants or loans, during 1965, about 5,000 trainees came to Israel and 650 Israeli "experts" took on assignments abroad.[29] These efforts focused particularly on Africa; approximately half of those who took courses in Israel between 1958 and 1965 were African.[30]

Israel was by no means the only country to offer international trainings to Kenyans. Overseas training and education also represented an important component of United States development policy in the 1960s. In 1962, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided U.S.-based trainings for seventy-five Kenyan agricultural staff, as well as training for public service and community

development workers.[31] USAID continued to offer trainings in the years following, at various levels, both in the United States and in Kenya.[32] Kenya's in-country trainings focused, especially, on extension services, and USAID projected they would reach 70 percent of agricultural instructors by July 1964.[33] These trainings were brief, however, often only a week long. Kenya's future political elite spent greater time in Western settings. Between 1959 and 1963, assistance programs brought close to 800 East Africans to the United States to pursue higher education on scholarship.[34] USAID believed educational exchanges contributed to Kenya's efforts to train government and development officials. Indeed, more than 90 percent of these students returned to Kenya, and many played central roles in postcolonial society. American-educated Kenyans made up half of the nation's parliamentarians for the next quarter-century, and they occupied positions as cabinet ministers, civil servants, ambassadors, professors, doctors, conservationists, and business executives.[35] Kenyans also attended university in other parts of the world, such as the United Kingdom, the Soviet bloc, Uganda, and India.[36]

In spite of the distance of the trip to Israel and the uniqueness of the experience, Oyalo did not dwell on the training. Though he raised the topic in our conversation, he summed up the series of events concisely, "The government was trying to look for the people who could be trained outside, who could go for an education program outside. So, I was among the people picked to go to Israel."[37] Israel prided itself on its "highly efficient extension service, which in turn became one of its largest training institutions for students from developing countries."[38] These included general programs on extension work, as well as more specific courses on cooperatives, poultry, irrigation, agricultural planning, and fertilizers.[39] Despite the relevance of the subject matter and Israel's experience training extension officers, Oyalo did not emphasize the content of the course, but rather, seemed to want to convey his expertise and worldliness. He took pride in his selection.

On other details of his past agricultural work, Oyalo's memory was much clearer. He could recount the precise number of acres per farm in the different settlements, as well as the specific crops grown, and he spoke in depth about farm competitions, farmers' training centers, and local cooperatives. Yet, when I asked follow up questions about the training in Israel, he answered only in brief, vague terms, noting that he went "for agriculture." That is, Oyalo's account downplays the subject matter covered in the Israeli training. In all likelihood, this reflects the inadequacy of the course itself. The vast majority of Israeli trainings for low-level technocrats lasted a couple weeks, and most course instructors did not work full-time.[40] Trainees were tasked with learning "an enormous amount" of technical information in a short period, but officials also hoped students would become open to "new ideas and attitudes" generally.[41] Leopold Laufer, a USAID official who interviewed participants in Israeli training programs, wrote that many "indicated that they felt overwhelmed by the work load and the intensity of the

schedule" and to some, it was little more than "a glorious joy ride of little lasting significance."[42] In a separate study, economist Mordechai Kreinin found that when those lower in the "administrative hierarchy" tried to implement what they had learned, their superiors resisted change. In addition, the differences in the environment and in farming practices, and the Israeli instructors' unfamiliarity with Africa, meant course material was not always well-suited to Kenyan conditions. In spite of these issues, the archival record on overseas trainings tends to emphasize the significance of these courses. Oyalo's account raises questions about whether these trainings really impacted the work of low-level technocrats, though at the same time, suggests their significance for professional prestige.

Manasi Esipeya's life followed a similar trajectory to Oyalo, though he did not travel abroad for training. Also a secondary school graduate in the 1950s, Esipeya worked in the private sector before moving into the public sector during decolonization. In 1964, he became a settlement officer and, by 1966, he had been promoted to senior settlement officer, overseeing almost thirty different settlement schemes. With Esipeya's prior experience in agricultural administration and management, he took up these higher-level positions which, in the initial years after independence, had been primarily monopolized by Europeans. More so than Oyalo, in his oral account, Esipeya's discourse very closely mirrored the principles of midcentury high-modernist agriculture. He asserted that, through farmers' trainings and experimental plots, agricultural officials had "reformed those people who had never seen a grade cow, who had never seen a certified seed."[43] In mentioning grade cattle and certified seeds, Esipeya emphasized new "technologies"—only recently available to Africans—meant to maximize their output.[44] In drawing on the language of "reform" and highlighting farmers' trainings and experimental plots, Esipeya distinguished between his agricultural expertise and rural farming practices, implying, in contrast, that Kenyan agronomy needed to be improved and that farmers did not possess adequate agricultural knowledge. As a senior settlement officer, however, Esipeya would have been far removed from daily interactions with farmers.

While Esipeya did not participate in any trainings abroad, as a settlement officer and then a senior settlement officer, he would have been more likely to engage regularly with Western aid workers and with more senior Kenyan policymakers, many of whom were educated in the West.[45] Indeed, many nations and transnational institutions offered substantial, and more regular, courses in-country, what Israel called "on the spot" trainings. This suggests that physical travel abroad may have been less important than sustained contact with actors articulating Western development ideologies. Oyalo and Esipeya's narratives serve as a reminder that overseas trainings may not have been as effective as continual engagement with proponents of Western development orthodoxies.

Though the vast majority of economic development interventions in the western highlands revolved around land, agriculture, and pastoralism, the government of Kenya also initiated rural industrial development in the early postcolonial period. After fits and starts, the Pan African Paper Mills factory, located in the town of Webuye, produced its first roll of paper in 1974.[46] The product of a public-private development partnership, the factory was majority-owned and managed by the Birla Group, an Indian business conglomerate. Factory jobs quickly transformed Webuye—once "very small, just a market, not even a town," according to a lifelong resident—into a bustling, small city in the early heyday of the paper industry.[47] Workers flocked to the town. Joseph Juma Lukorito was drawn to Webuye in 1975, immediately after the paper mill opened. He recounted that he had been working as a teacher when he saw an advertisement in the newspaper, so he applied and took up a job at the factory.[48] The paper mill employed 1,500 people at the time, with a variety of skill levels and jobs. As with agricultural development, training became essential to running the factory. Lukorito noted that, initially, it was difficult to find people with the required educational background, so they took about thirty people to India and elsewhere for training ahead of the factory's opening. Engineers studied at the Industrial Training Center in Nairobi.

When he started at the factory, Lukorito had a high school certificate, had graduated from polytechnic college, and had received a higher diploma in applied industrial chemistry. With his extensive education, Lukorito began as a laboratory supervisor. In the lab, he analyzed raw materials and evaluated products. Throughout his career, he was promoted, moving from lab supervisor to chief chemist, all the way up to director of goods control and environment. When Lukorito became chief chemist, he received a scholarship through the Kenyan government to learn more about the paper-making industry in Sweden in the 1980s. He also traveled to Germany for another training course to learn about specialty boards in the 1990s. Though Lukorito brought up these trainings abroad, he also noted that he attended more than 200 seminars overall.

Similar to Oyalo, Lukorito's narrative focused on other historical events. He clearly evinced pride in his extensive training, and in the fact that he won scholarships to study abroad, but he did not emphasize the content of the trainings or the experience of visiting different European countries. As a highly educated, upper-level employee, who had traveled abroad multiple times and also attended numerous professional development seminars, these trips had become less of a novelty. Instead of emphasizing his trainings, Lukorito's dissatisfaction with the management and the Kenyan government far outweighed his excitement with regard to his travel. At the time of the interview, the Pan African Paper factory had been closed for a few years due to credit problems, unprofitability, and a lack of investment. The town, previously "ever-full-of-life," was eerily quiet and empty.[49] Lukorito, and hundreds of others, had lost their jobs. Throughout much of our conversation, Lukorito discussed the problems with the

factory: labor issues, corruption, and fiscal mismanagement. He emphasized that Indian employees received higher salaries than Kenyans, and that the relationship between the two groups was tense. At the time, these disappointments were all-encompassing, since they had upended both his livelihood and the narrative of his life. Though he articulated satisfaction with his education and overseas training, those specialized trainings on the chemistry of paper-making were non-transferable to other industries and unusable with the factory's closure.[50]

Even so, both Oyalo and Lukorito's life histories demonstrate the opportunities that existed for Kenyans to travel abroad in the second half of the twentieth century. Generally tied to employment, these short trips had less impact on the lives of Kenyans than other momentous events or more continual engagements with Western people and ideas. In the narratives they came to tell of their lives, travel and training abroad did not occupy a particularly meaningful place. The next section turns to an examination of expatriates who came to Kenya and rural Kenyan interactions with these temporary visitors.

The World Comes to Kenya

Even without traveling abroad, rural Kenyans became globalized and many considered themselves members of a global community. In the midcentury, media access—particularly through radios, but also newspaper—improved dramatically, fostering international connections.[51] At the same time, a growing number of venues provided engagements with Western aid workers, Western-trained Kenyans, or Western ideas, more broadly. These ranged from school classrooms, to food distribution centers, to farmers' trainings, to development project sites.

James Musamusi Matunda, a Maragoli farmer who settled in the Lumakanda scheme, engaged directly with Peace Corps Volunteers and other foreign aid workers during the 1960s. Unlike many of the other Maragoli settlers, Matunda was born and raised near the settlement in the western Rift Valley. During his childhood, he attended school at a Catholic mission and, as a teenager, began working on European farms. At independence, he recounted, the chief in his area nominated him for settlement, because he "saw me without land."[52] Matunda and his family joined over 600 other families, who settled on Lumakanda's 12,000 acres between 1963 and 1964. Similar to most settlement schemes and farms in the area, the settlers there produced maize and dairy, while growing other food crops, such as vegetables and legumes, for subsistence.

Matunda recounted that "*wazungu*" [Whites] from America and Germany assisted with the Lumakanda cooperative.[53] In postcolonial Kenya, cooperative marketing societies—charged with collecting loans and taxes, expanding technical support, and connecting farmers to state markets—were widespread. Most settlement schemes included a corresponding co-op, and state actors strongly encouraged settlers

to join.[54] Almost everyone I spoke with at six former settlement sites thought they had been required to join a cooperative society, though these were technically voluntary memberships. An educated local leader, Matunda was elected vice chairman of the Lumakanda cooperative society in 1964. This position brought him into contact with expatriates, since a number of PCVs and foreign aid workers became part of Kenya's cooperative staff.[55] Even fifty years later, Matunda could recall the names of the different volunteers he met during the 1960s, including Jim Bradley, who he said worked as an engineer, and two others he called Morgan and Tops, who helped out with administering the cooperative society.

John F. Kennedy signed an executive order establishing the Peace Corps in 1961, and the first group of volunteers arrived in Ghana the same year.[56] Though other nations and private organizations had already initiated their own youth volunteer programs, Kennedy's challenge to college students to go abroad, "working for the United States and working for freedom," inspired the greatest enthusiasm.[57] Motivated by the logic of modernization theory and by the Cold War, the Peace Corps first sent volunteers to Kenya in 1964.[58] Kenya had applied to the United States government for PCVs to "supply some of the skills particularly in fields of secondary education, agriculture, health and engineering," which Kenya did "not yet possess in sufficient quantity."[59]

Though there is no oral history with Jim Bradley deposited in the JFKL, the National Peace Corps Association "In Memoriam" website links to his obituary from 2017.[60] Born in 1942, Bradley's family moved around during his childhood. After graduating from high school in New York state, he spent a couple semesters at the University of Texas at Austin, before becoming a boilermaker in the shipyards of New Jersey and New York. From 1965 to 1967, he worked as a PCV in Kenya, where he "helped construct bridges, irrigation systems, and never passed up a chance to take pictures of giraffes and flamingos."[61] James Matunda formed an especially close relationship with Bradley, who—he recounted—taught him to drive a tractor. Later, Matunda applied for a loan and bought his own tractor. Possessing a tractor allowed farmers to plow more land more efficiently. Though the fifteen-acre plots of Lumakanda were not especially big, they were much larger than the small farms most Maragoli settlers were used to. Additionally, farmers could rent out their tractors to generate income. In other words, Matunda's memory of Bradley's assistance may be so vivid and positive, because it improved his family's life and contributed to their livelihood. Though Matunda did not offer much specificity about the other expatriates, he did note that, overall, they "did a very good job."[62]

Matunda made clear that his position as a co-op leader provided him the opportunity to get to know foreign volunteers. Indeed, most settlers had no memory of foreign aid workers coming to provide assistance with cooperatives or other development projects. Nora Kasigene—who settled in Lumakanda in 1963 with her husband—remembered only that "some people from the government came to help," but

said no one came from "other countries."[63] Certainly, as a woman, Kasigene's opportunities to engage with either domestic or international development staff would have been more constrained than her male counterparts. At the same time, most of the men I spoke with in Lumakanda also did not remember foreign volunteers. The archival record makes clear, though, that a number of American, Dutch, German, and Nordic aid workers were deployed throughout the region during the 1960s and 1970s.[64] While development provision was structured by gender, it was also structured by class. Matunda's relative wealth, education, and power compared to his fellow settlers—both male and female—gave him privileged access to aid workers. Even so, there were other ways to engage with Westerners and with Western ideas, whether that be at a farmers' training center or in a secondary school classroom, though these were also spaces of gendered and class exclusion.

Oral histories with returned Peace Corps Volunteers offer another perspective on these programs and the engagements they fostered. A few themes emerge from these accounts. First, many PCVs discussed their insufficient training. Thomas Bruyneel, a San Diego State graduate who majored in Political Science, volunteered from 1964 to 1966 with the first group assigned to Kenya. Bruyneel was placed on a settlement scheme and recounted, "They gave us some training in agriculture, which I'm not sure how effective that was … And, we spent a few days in Madison, looking at cows and so forth."[65] Michael Ford, another Political Science major in that same first group of volunteers sent to Kenya, graduated from the small liberal arts college of Knox. He noted, "I didn't know much … I knew, for example, how to create a ledger … You had to keep track of the loan accounts and all of the disbursements for each farm … What did I know, but common sense?"[66] The written record substantiates these accounts. A 1973 department of cooperative development report noted that PCVs had "little or no co-operative or business practical background and experience."[67] Volunteers' inexperience sat in contradiction to the expertise of the Nordic field advisors, trained in "marketing, education, finance and credit, horticulture, [and] dairy."[68]

In spite of the inadequate training, many PCVs received rapid promotions. Race and geographic privilege influenced who became an "expert." Michael Davidson, for example, recounted that he initially worked under a settlement officer (SO) but, within a few months, he had become the settlement officer and, by his second year, he had become a senior settlement officer.[69] For the ministry of Lands and Settlement, PCVs could "make a considerable difference" with regard to their "very strained staff position," not only because they could help extend the period of supervision on settlement schemes, but also, because they came "free of charge."[70] Even so, when the department of Settlement initially requested help from the Peace Corps, they envisioned volunteers receiving extensive training, and they stressed that PCVs should work "under an experienced SO."[71]

In practice, PCVs were given a great deal of responsibility quickly. This meant they were more likely to supervise Kenyan bureaucrats and less likely to interact with rural farmers, which helps explain why so few Kenyans remembered a PCV presence. In contrast to the other PCV oral histories, Michael Ford, a Black PCV, emphasized his relationships with Kenyans. Perhaps, on account of his race, he had an easier time fitting in, though he noted, "It was clear that I was a little different … They didn't know what to make of me, because I didn't fit one of the easy categories." He recalled that he "palled around with people," but he kept his relationships professional, given his job and position in the community.[72] Female PCVs had an even more difficult time forming close relationships. Kae Dakin was one of a few women in her cohort—placed in Kenya from 1965 to 1967—who were part of a married couple volunteering together. Like others, Dakin possessed little appropriate training and was thrown into a job as a dairy officer, in which she encouraged farmers to dip their cattle to avoid tick-borne diseases, and helped artificially inseminate cows and castrate bulls. She recounted, "It wasn't a skill I came with … I majored in English. I knew how to read Shakespeare."[73] Not only did Dakin lack experience, but in the Gikuyu community, women did not care for cattle. She primarily worked with men, which she found challenging.

The Peace Corps created other tensions. Dakin and her husband moved in the middle of their placement, because they had been accused of being CIA agents. Dakin believed that a Kenyan settlement officer who had studied in Russia was unhappy to have them in his community and thus made the accusation.[74] On the other hand, Roland Johnson—who served in Kenya from 1964 to 1966—explained that he "raised a lot of hell" about issues with settlement programming, writing a critical report to the ministry of Settlement. As a result, he said no future PCVs were seconded to settlement.[75] Thomas Bruyneel also recounted that his community's member of Parliament made an anti-Peace Corps statement.[76]

Indeed, parliamentarians made such statements frequently. Many members of Parliament criticized the Peace Corps for some of the very issues the PCVs brought up in their oral histories. A number of MPs complained that PCVs lacked training and relevant experience. For instance, in Kenya's House of Representatives on 27 July 1966, Ombese Makone, member for Kitutu East, wondered, "… some of these people come straight from school and some have perhaps failed in life in their places … how do you find them useful in the veterinary field, which is a technical field? … How do these people manage who have difficulties with the language, and with local conditions …"[77] James Osogo, the minister for Information and Broadcasting replied, "… if they come for veterinary work, they must have done some practical work in the animal field in their own countries …"[78] Yet, the accounts of PCVs, like Kae Dakin, illustrate that some volunteers were tasked with technical jobs for which they had no training. Four years later, in July 1970, Kimamu Njiru Gichoya, of Kirinyaga East, colorfully asserted, "… when you look at these Peace Corps, to me, they look as if they are tourists who come

here due to the simple reason that they cannot afford on their own accord to come to Africa … They spend only two years; the first year for sightseeing and the second year for packing."[79] Clearly, PCVs struck a nerve with some legislators.

At the heart of these criticisms lay two other issues: Africanization and foreign relations. As Kenya decolonized, the independent government instituted a policy of Africanization, in which "local people … should replace expatriates."[80] While Africanization progressed quickly in some areas, in the rural development sector, ex-colonial officials and white settlers stayed on, and new foreign volunteers and aid workers arrived. Some Kenyan politicians interpreted their presence as impeding Africanization. Similarly, as a newly independent nation, Kenya at once solicited funding from foreign nations and transnational institutions, while also seeking to assert its sovereignty. In the midst of the Cold War, some legislators decried foreign interference in Kenya's domestic affairs.

In triangulating between the oral histories of rural Kenyans, the PCV accounts, and the written record, it is clear that, in some respects, these accounts converge, while in others, they deviate. The critiques of PCV inexperience were borne out through their own accounts. However, the politicization of these positions seems to have represented some degree of grandstanding. While PCVs did recount accusations of spying or criticism by politicians, very few rural Kenyans remembered interacting with the volunteers. In other words, legislative concern that PCVs would "transmit American ideas," seem to have been inflated.[81]

Though some Kenyans, like James Musamusi Matunda, were deeply shaped by their engagements with Westerners and Western ideas, most rural Kenyans had little to no interaction with foreign aid workers. Untrained Peace Corps Volunteers often received quick promotions, and they became responsible for supervision of more junior bureaucrats. Even when foreign development workers did occupy low-level positions, they joined an overstretched and undertrained technocracy, which limited the amount of time they could spend with any individual farmer.[82] And yet, if this history were written based on the archival record alone, the exaggerated claims of officials about the impact of international trainings or of MPs about the politicization of rural Kenyans through American volunteers would be more difficult to critically interrogate. Oral histories help to moderate the power given to written sources and to those with the privilege to create them.

Conclusion

A 1963 circular touted that, through trainings for lower-level agricultural extension workers, USAID would "have the entire field staff reached and thus the vast majority of the farming population" within a year and half.[83] USAID, like Israel, chose "more superficial training for the many" over in-depth training for the few.[84] Oral histories

make clear that these decisions had repercussions and experience on the ground was far different. Not only did the short trainings seem to have little impact on agricultural staff, but these same staff only rarely engaged with local farmers, since they were tasked with traveling vast distances between hundreds of farms by foot or bicycle.

In order for trainings to have a significant effect, they needed to be sustained. Similarly, most Kenyan farmers did not engage with Western aid workers, and those who did, often occupied privileged positions within their rural societies. Absent oral accounts, though, this historical reality would be more difficult to recover. National government and transnational institutional archives tend to document the perspectives of powerbrokers far removed from the actual implications of the policies they create. At the same time, professional pressure to demonstrate success incentivizes these actors to overstate the impact of programs. This article thus contends that oral histories are integral to transnational historical research. These sources give voice to those excluded from the archives, offering a distinct perspective. They also reveal the many networks connecting rural, remote Kenyan villages to the wider world and raise questions about the hegemony of Western development ideologies in the second half of the twentieth century.

Kara Moskowitz is an Associate Professor of History at the University of Missouri–St. Louis, specializing in modern Africa, decolonization, and international development with a focus on Kenya. She teaches undergraduate and graduate courses on African history and global history. Her first book, *Seeing Like a Citizen: Decolonization, Development, and the Making of Kenya* was published in 2019 with the New African Histories series at Ohio University Press. Her work has also appeared in *Past & Present, Gender & History,* and the *Journal of African History*, among others. She would like to thank Muey Saeteurn, Julie Weiskopf, Tiffany Trimmer, and the two anonymous readers for their feedback, and Daniel Heller for generously sharing some of his sources. She can be reached at: moskowitzk@umsl.edu.

NOTES

[1] Jan Vansina, *Oral Tradition: A Study in Historical Methodology* (Chicago: Aldine Publication
Company, 1965).

[2] Luise White, *Speaking with Vampires: Rumor and History in Colonial Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 32.

[3] Luise White, *The Comforts of Home: Prostitution in Colonial Nairobi* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 25.

[4] Leroy Vail and Landeg White, *Power and the Praise Poem: Southern African Voices in History* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1991).

[5] David W. Cohen, "Doing Social History from Pim's Doorway," in *Reliving the Past: The Worlds of Social History*, ed. Olivier Zunz (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985); Steven Feierman, "Colonizers, Scholars, and the Creation of Invisible Histories," in *Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture*, ed. Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

[6] Derek R. Peterson, *Creative Writing: Translation, Bookkeeping, and the Work of Imagination in Colonial Kenya* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2004), 5; Kenda Mutongi, *Worries of the Heart: Widows, Family, and Community in Kenya* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 5; Jacob Dlamini, *Safari Nation: A Social History of Kruger National Park* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2020), 289-290.

[7] Colin Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism, 1964-1971* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Gregory Mann, *From Empires to NGOs in the West African Sahel: The Road to Nongovernmentality* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

[8] James Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998); Michael Havinden and David Meredith, *Colonialism and Development: Britain and Its Tropical Colonies, 1850 – 1960* (London: Routledge, 1993); Daniel Immerwahr, *Thinking Small: The United States and the Lure of Community Development* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015); Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Matthew Connelly, *Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010); Quinn Slobadian, *Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018).

[9] Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995); Anjali Arondekar, *For the Record: On Sexuality and the Colonial Archive in India* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009); Marisa J. Fuentes, *Dispossessed Lives: Enslaved Women, Violence, and the Archive* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016); Ann Laura Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

[10] This area had historically all been part of Uasin Gishu District, but border areas were excised to Kakamega District and Western Province during decolonization. More recently, some districts have been amalgamated and are now called counties.

[11] In colonial Kenya, "squatter" referred to tenant farm laborers, but in the postcolonial era squatter came to mean those living on property to which they had no title. This latter definition applies here.

[12] Other subgroups of the Kalenjin and Luyia, as well as members of the Luo and Kisii ethnic groups lived and live in the wider region, which is marked by its ethnic heterogeneity.

[13] Dorothy L. Hodgson, *Once Intrepid Warriors: Gender, Ethnicity, and the Cultural Politics of Maasai Development* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001).

[14] David M. Anderson and Emma Lochery, "Violence and Exodus in Kenya's Rift Valley, 2008: Predictable and Preventable?" *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 2, no. 2 (2008): 328-43; Karuti Kanyinga, "The Legacy of the White Highlands: Land Rights, Ethnicity and the Post-2007 Election Violence in Kenya," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 27, no. 3 (2009): 325–44.

[15] Feminist scholars, particularly those working in the Global South, have argued for the importance of women's life histories: Margaret Strobel, *Muslim Women in Mombasa, 1890–1975* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979); Susan N. G. Geiger, "Women's Life Histories: Method and Content," *Signs* 11, no. 2 (1986): 334–51.

[16] P. D. Abrams, *Kenya's Land Re-settlement Story: How 66,000 African Families Were Settled on 1325 Large Scale European Owned Farms* (Nairobi: Challenge, 1979); C. P. R. Nottidge, *The Million-Acre Settlement Scheme, 1962–1966* (Nairobi: Department of Settlement, 1966); Christopher Leo, *Land and Class in Kenya* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984); H. W. O. Okoth-Ogendo, *Tenants of the Crown: Evolution of Agrarian Law and Institutions in Kenya* (Nairobi: ACTS Press, 1991); Sara Berry, *No Condition Is Permanent: The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Chance in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993); Karuti Kanyinga, "The Land Question in Kenya: Struggles, Accumulation and Changing Politics" (PhD diss., Roskilde University, 1998); Anderson and Lochery, "Violence and Exodus in Kenya's Rift Valley."

[17] The British Parliament passed the Colonial Development and Welfare Act in 1940, while the French passed the Investment Fund for Economic and Social Development in 1946. Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society*. On Kenya's land reform during this period, see: M. P. K. Sorrenson, *Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country: A Study in Government Policy* (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1967). For examples of postwar development globally, see: Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Daniel Immerwahr, *Thinking Small: The United States and the Lure of Community Development* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015).

[18] Kara Moskowitz, *Seeing Like a Citizen: Decolonization, Development, and the Making of Kenya* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2019), 38.

[19] Beyond planning errors, many scholars have shown that colonial and postcolonial agrarian and environmental science was misconceived. See David M. Anderson, *Eroding the Commons: The Politics of Ecology in Baringo, Kenya 1890-1963* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002); Wapulumuka Oliver Mulwafu, *Conservation Song: A History of Peasant-State Relations and the Environment in Malawi, 1860-2000* (Cambridge: The White Horse Press, 2010).

[20] Moskowitz, *Seeing Like a Citizen*, 47-59.

[21] Sorrenson, *Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country*, 117-18.

[22] Michael P. Cowen, "The Commercialization of Food Production in Kenya after 1945," in *Imperialism, Colonialism, and Hunger: East and Central Africa*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1983), 199; W. T. W. Morgan, "The 'White Highlands' of Kenya," *The Geographical Journal* 129, no. 2 (1963): 143.

[23] Kenya National Archives (KNA), Nairobi, TR/8/1826, R. C. Noble, Co-operative Officer, Eldoret, to the assistant commissioner for Co-operative Development (Settlement), "Application for Registration. Chekalini Farmers' Co-operative Society," 26 March 1964.

[24] After independence, colonial officers and ex-European settlers became employed by new development institutions, such as the World Bank. See: World Bank Group Archives (WBGA), Washington, DC, IBRD/IDA AFR, East Africa, 1082474, Correspondence with ex Agriculture Development Service Staff–Volume 5.

[25] Wilberforce Oyalo, interview by author, Chekalini, 11 January 2013.

[26] On Israel development aid to Kenya, see Daniel Kupfert Heller, "Israeli Aid and the 'African Woman': The Gendered Politics of International Development, 1958-73," *Jewish Social Studies* 25, no. 2 (2020): 49-78.

[27] KNA BN/81/165, Sandy Storrar, deputy director of Agriculture, "Preliminary Paper on Co-operative Farming Based on Observation Made during a Recent Visit to Israel," 6 March 1962; Tom Mboya, *Freedom and After* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1963), 173, 203.

[28] WBGA 1575861 East Africa: General–Technical Assistance–1969-1971 Correspondence–Vol. 1, Bruce M. Cheek to Mr. Chaufournier, Mr. Mirza, and Mr. Reitter, "Israeli Technical Assistance," 21 July 1970.

[29] Leopold Laufer, *Israel and the Developing Countries: New Approaches to Cooperation* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1967), 28.

[30] Ibid, 78.

[31] National Archives at College Park (NACP), Record Group 286, Department of State, USAID Mission to Kenya Program Division, P 573 Subject Files: 1961-1980, Container 2, PRM 1-5 Program Implementation Plans, "Kenya: Outline of Proposed A.I.D. Projects for Fiscal Year 1963, Revision 1: July 11, 1962."

[32] NACP, Record Group 286, Department of State, USAID Mission to Kenya Program Division, P 573 Subject Files: 1961-1980, Container 2, PRM 1-5, From Nairobi to AID/W, "Physical Accomplishments of A.I.D. Program, Reference AID to Circular 24, Feb. 21," 12 March 1963.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Tom Shachtman, *Airlift to America: How Barack Obama, Sr., John F. Kennedy, Tom Mboya, and 800 East African Students Changed their World and Ours* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2009), 7.

[35] Ibid., 226-27.

[36] Daniel Branch, "Political Traffic: Kenyan Students in Eastern and Central Europe, 1958–69," *Journal of Contemporary History* 53 (2018), 812-13; Timothy Nicholson, "East African Students in a (Post-)Imperial World," in Simon Sleight and Shirleene Robinson (eds), *Children, Childhood and Youth in the British World* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 117.

[37] Wilberforce Oyalo, interview by author, Chekalini, 11 January 2013.

[38] Laufer, *Israel and the Developing Countries*, 26.

[39] Ibid, 164.

[40] Ibid, 65. Israel did have long-term courses, but those were usually attached to universities, such as the Haifa Technical Institute.

[41] Ibid, 156-57.

[42] Ibid, 156-57.

[43] Manasi Esipeya, interview by author, Chekalini, 11 January 2013.

[44] On Malian women's innovative use of modest technologies: Laura Ann Twagira, *Embodied Engineering: Gendered Labor, Food Security, and Taste in Twentieth-Century Mali* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2021).

[45] Nicholson, "East African Students in a (Post-)Imperial World," 117-18.

[46] Kara Moskowitz, "'Are You Planting Trees or Are You Planting People?' Squatter Resistance and International Development in the Making of a Kenyan Postcolonial Political Order (c. 1963-78)," *Journal of African History* 56, no. 1 (2015): 99-118.

[47] Joab Siundu Macheso, interview by author, Webuye, 11 July 2013.

[48] Joseph Juma Lukorito, interview by author, Webuye, 12 July 2013.

[49] Kenneth Lusaka, "Pan Paper's Revival a Boost for Bungoma," *East African Standard*, 3 August 2016.

[50] The factory reopened in 2016 under new ownership.

[51] Graham Mytton, *Mass Communication in Africa* (London: Edward Arnold, 1983), 3; Fay Gadsden, "African Press in Kenya, 1945-1952," *Journal of African History* 21, no. 4 (1980): 515.

[52] James Musamusi Matunda, interview by author, Lumakanda, 19 July 2016.

[53] Ibid.

[54] John W. Harbeson, *Nation-Building in Kenya: The Role of Land Reform* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 286.

[55] KNA UGD, "Uasin Gishu District Annual Report, 1967"; KNA TR/19/253, "Handing Over Report – Adungosi John to Lazaro A. Ruto," 20 January 1966.

[56] Julius A. Amin, "United States Peace Corps Volunteers in Guinea: A Case Study of US-African Relations during the Cold War," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 16, no. 2 (1998): 197.

[57] Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, *All You Need Is Love: The Peace Corps and the Spirit of the 1960s* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 11.

[58] Molly Geidel, *Peace Corps Fantasies: How Development Shaped the Global Sixties* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015).

[59] KNA AVS/1/18, T. K. B. Mbathi, director of Personnel, to all permanent secretaries, "United States Peace Corps," 20 May 1964.

[60] National Peace Corps Association, "In Memoriam – May 2017," accessed 15 December 2021, https://www.peacecorpsconnect.org/articles/in-memoriam-may-2017.

[61] "James Bradley, 1942-2017," *El Paso Times powered by Legacy*, accessed 15 December 2021, https://www.legacy.com/us/obituaries/elpasotimes/name/james-bradley-obituary?id=9788148.

[62] James Musamusi Matunda, interview by author, Lumakanda, 19 July 2016.

[63] Nora Kasigene, Lumakanda, interview by author, 30 October 2012.

[64] KNA RVP, "Rift Valley Province Annual Report, 1966"; KNA TR/1/208, "A Supplement to – Co-operatives in the Economic and Social Development in Kenya," 8 January 1976.

[65] Interview with Thomas Bruyneel, 18 November 2001, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library Returned Peace Corps Volunteer Collection (hereafter JFKL RPCV).

[66] Interview with Michael Ford, 6 November 2008, JFKL RPCV.

[67] KNA TR/1/208, "Department of Co-operative Development: 10 Years of Staff Development," 1973.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Interview with Michael Davidson, 11 November 2015, JFKL RPCV.

[70] KNA AVS/13/31, "Report by the Director of Settlement," June 1964.

[71] KNA AVS/13/31, "Peace Corps," G.R. Henderson, Deputy Director of Settlement to the Ministry of Agriculture, 11 June, 1964.

[72] Interview with Michael Ford, 6 November 2008, JFKL RPCV.

[73] Interview with Kae Dakin, 8 January 2016, JFKL RPCV.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Interview with Roland H. Johnson, 26 April 2002, JFKL RPCV.

[76] Interview with Thomas Bruyneel, 18 November 2001, JFKL RPCV.

[77] Republic of Kenya, *The National Assembly, House of Representatives, Official Report (Hansard)*, vol. 9 (part 2), 27 July 1966.

[78] Ibid.

[79] Republic of Kenya, *The National Assembly Official Report (Hansard)*, vol. 20 (part 2), 14 July 1970.

[80] Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, *Legislative Council Debates Official Report (Hansard)*, vol. 89, 18 July 1962.

[81] Republic of Kenya, *The National Assembly, House of Representatives Official Report (Hansard)*, vol. 8, 10 March 1966.

[82] Moskowitz, *Seeing Like a Citizen*, 6.

[83] NACP, Record Group 286, Department of State, USAID Mission to Kenya Program Division, P 573 Subject Files: 1961-1980, Container 2, PRM 1-5, From Nairobi to AID/W, "Physical Accomplishments of A.I.D. Program, Reference AID to Circular 24, Feb. 21," 12 March 1963.

[84] Laufer, *Israel and the Developing Countries*, 157.